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STATE OF OHIO 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
ALAN DA VIS, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Defendant. 
) 
) SS. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IN THE COURT COMMON PLEAS 
CASE NO. 312322 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
During the week of January 31, 2000, the Court heard argument on a number of motions 
in limine raised by each of the parties. The Court announced its decisions with respect to these 
motions, either in open court (on February 4, 2000, and on February 11, 2000, respectively) or in 
written orders (on February 5, 2000 and on February 12, 2000). The decisions on these motions 
in limine are necessarily provisional and can be revisited by the parties during the context of the 
trial. 1 This Memorandum Opinion is being issued with respect to the decisions announced from 
the bench on February 11, 2000, in order to provide a more detailed understanding of the Court's 
rationale. 
1. PlaintifPs Motion to Exclude Testimony of Pastor Ernie Sanders 
Plaintiff seeks to exclude the testimony of Pastor Ernie Sanders on the basis of the 
clergyman-penitent privilege. The Court understands that this witness will testify as to certain 
discussions between Pastor Sanders and certain incarcerated individuals who Pastor Sanders 
1 Indeed, failure to raise these issues during trial constitutes waiver of the issues on 
appeal. 
1 
. , 
-
visited in his clerical capacity. 
I am not persuaded by Plaintiffs blanket assertion that all of Pastor Sanders' anticipated 
testimony will be privileged. Not every conversation between a cleric and a member of his or 
her congregation is privileged under O.R.C. 2317.02. See generally, State v. Bennett, 1995 WL 
276673 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. 1995), unreported. When deposed, Pastor Sanders selectively chose 
not to answer certain questions on the grounds of privilege while not objecting to others. 
Nonetheless, the motion in limine is granted because the Court's review of the anticipated 
testimony indicates that the testimony will be inadmissible hearsay. See, Ohio Rule of Evidence 
802. While this issue has not been argued by the parties, the Court believes it appropriate to raise 
this issue sua sponte, with regard to this particular evidence. 
Should Defendant seek to introduce this evidence for a non-hearsay purpose,2 or pursuant 
to an exception to the hearsay rule, it must first seek permission of the Court. At that point, the 
Court will conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury if Plaintiff wishes to pursue its 
objection regarding privilege. At that hearing, the Court will determine ifthere are any 
privileged aspects to Pastor Sanders' anticipated testimony. 
2. State's Motion to Exclude Evidence of Other Alleged Homicides of Richard 
Eberling 
Defendant seeks to exclude reference to homicides committed or alleged to be committed 
by Richard Eberling. The State relies on Evidence Rule 404 which generally prohibits evidence 
of "other acts" to prove that a person acted in conformity therewith at another time. 
2 The Court notes that the door to admission of this testimony may be opened, for 
- example, by Plaintiffs introduction of a hearsay statement of Richard Eberling. Evid. R. 806. 
2 
-The Court's research revealed that, as a general propostion, Rule 404 has been applied to 
civil cases. See generally, Tschantz v. Ferguson, 97 Oh. App. 3d 693, 717 (Cuy. Cty. 1994). 
Whether Rule 404 applies with equal force and to the same extent when dealing with a non-
party 's "other acts" is a closer question, and the Court's research has not found that courts 
throughout the United States employ a uniform rule of law in this regard, when dealing with 
Ohio Rule 404 or its federal equivalent. Compare State v. Simmons, 1994 Ohio App. Lexis 658 
(Clark Cty. App.) (third party's "other acts" must fit as a "signature crime") with United States v. 
Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) (other person's "other acts," ifrelevant, are not precluded 
by Rule 404 if sufficiently similar). Neither of these cases involved a criminal case where it 
would appear that failure to admit a third party's "other acts" tending to exculpate the accused 
would have obvious due process considerations which may not be present to the same, if any, 
extent in this case. 
Whether this Court chooses to follow Simmons or Stevens, or whether this Court 
determines that a middle ground is most appropriate,3 it would appear that, at a minimum, that 
there must be some nexus shown between Richard Eberling and the Marilyn Sheppard homicide 
before there can even arguably be a basis for admission of "other acts" evidence regarding 
Eberling. Otherwise, as Defendant argues, evidence of Eberling's "other acts" will be admissible 
in every homicide case. At this point, that nexus has not been made because I have heard no 
evidence in this case and the proffer to this point has been understandably limited. Accordingly, 
the motion to exclude the testimony is granted to the limited extent that mention may not be 
3 The parties are encouraged to continue their research on this issue. 
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..-.. made of these "other acts" until the Court is able to see what, if any connection can be 
demonstrated. Because the Court's initial determination regarding the admissibility of this 
"other acts" evidence is made pursuant to Rule 104, Ohio R. Evid., it may be made by a detailed 
proffer outside the presence of the jury. In the meantime, no mention shall be made of these 
"other acts" without prior approval of the court. 
-
-
3. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence of Prior Acquittal and Proceedings 
Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of the previous legal proceedings regarding Samuel 
Sheppard. the motion is denied, with leave for Defendant to raise it as individual pieces of 
evidence are introduced and as testimony is elicited. 
However, the Court believes it appropriate to express at this preliminary stage its present 
view as to the relevance of this line of evidence. In so doing, the Court is not issuing an advisory 
opinion - rather, the parties should consider the following as dicta which will enable them to 
hone their arguments regarding this evidence when the issues become ripe: 
Dr. Sheppard's prior conviction and incarceration are relevant issues in this case; indeed, 
the facts of his conviction, incarceration and subsequent acquittal are not disputed. Moreover, 
the respective circumstances surrounding the first trial and the second trial are relevant in the 
jury's weighing of the testimony in those trials. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), 
noted that the first trial's publicity problems had a potential impact on witnesses as well as jurors. 
Accordingly, some inquiry in this regard is proper, although this evidence may not become 
relevant until after trial testimony from the prior trials is introduced. 
As for Dr. Sheppard's efforts to set aside his conviction, both through direct appeal and 
collateral habeas relief, it is not as apparent as to why this is relevant. There is no issue that the 
4 
~ 1954 conviction was wrongful in that there was a denial of due process. Whether Dr. Sheppard 
was wrongfully convicted in 1954 and released on direct appeal (which did not happen), as 
opposed to ·whether he was wrongfully convicted and released on a writ of habeas corpus some 
ten years later (which did happen)does not appear to help the jury decide whether Plaintiff has 
proved its case. 
Similarly, forensic or other evidence which was brought to light in the past decade may 
well be relevant to this case. However, the steps which were taken to find that evidence would 
not seem to be relevant, unless, possibly, those steps help the jury to be able to evaluate the 
strength of the newly discovered evidence. 
It may very well be that many persons, including the jury, would be interested to know 
how the Estate of Sheppard endeavored to bring this case to court. However, the investigative 
and/or legal process which brings this case to court does not seem to be relevant to the jury's 
determination. The fact of the matter is that this case is now in court. Now that this case is here, 
the jury must decide what evidence is there that Samuel Sheppard was wrongfully convicted and 
how much weight, if any, does that evidence deserve. To be relevant, evidence of the process by 
which the evidence was acquired (i.e. evidence of the legal and investigative process) must 
somehow affect the issue of whether Samuel Sheppard was wrongfully convicted. Thus, for 
example, to the extent that a witness' testimony from the 1954 trial is presented, evidence of any 
circumstances of the trial which had an effect on that particular witness or which can be 
demonstrated to have had an effect on all the witnesses, would be relevant -- because the legal 
process (i.e. the circumstances of the trial) would be probative of the credibility of the testimony. 
5 
,,_..... 4. Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Evidence from Coroner's Inquest 
-
-
Plaintiff seeks to exclude Samuel Sheppard's testimony at the Coroner's inquest on the 
basis of constitutional considerations of the 5th and 6th Amendment's right to due process and 
counsel, respectively. 
Without reaching the constitutional considerations cited by the Plaintiff, the court is 
granting the motion at this preliminary stage on the basis of potential hearsay. Samuel 
Sheppard's testimony at the Coroner's inquest is an out of court statement. The court is not 
aware of whether those statements are being offered for their truth. If they are, they would 
appear to be inadmissible hearsay. Samuel Sheppard is not a party to this case; his estate is. As 
such, Dr. Sheppard is a person in privity to his estate, but he is not his estate. The Ohio Rules of 
Evidence do not explicitly provide for statements by those in privity to a party, which Dr. 
Sheppard is, to be admissible against a party. At common law, Ohio recognized such "privity" 
admissions. See, e.g. Helman v. P,C,C & St. L Railway Co., 58 Ohio St. 400 (1898). However, 
the codification of the evidence code in 1980 did not explicitly provide for the admissibility of 
such privity admissions and the legislative history, while not explicit, suggests that this failure to 
provide an exception for privity admissions was intentional. See, Staff Notes, Ohio Rules of 
Evidence 801(D)(2) and 801(D)(2)(a). Accord, Giannelli & Snyder, Evidence, Sect. 801.22 
(Baldwin's Ohio Practice Series, 1996) ("Privity admissions are not admissible."). 
Because the parties did not address the "privity admission"issue, they will be given the 
opportunity to address this issue outside the presence of the jury should the State advise that it 
wishes the Court to revisit this ruling. However, in the absence of additional authority, or in the 
absence of a proffer as to a non-hearsay basis for admissibility, this evidence will continue to be 
6 
inadmissible. 
5. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Opinion Testimony of Samuel 
Sheppard's Guilt or Innocence. 
The State seeks to preclude witnesses from testifying as to their respective opinions as to 
the guilt or innocence of Samuel Sheppard. 
Rule of Evidence 702 permits lay witnesses to tender opinions only when those opinions 
would be helpful to the jury. The Court finds that lay opinions as to guilt or innocence are not 
helpful to this jury and therefore grants the motion as to the ability of either party to elicit such 
opinions from lay witnesses on direct examination. 
Rules 702 through 704 address expert opinions. Here again, while expert opinion is 
permitted on ultimate issues in a case, those opinions must still relate to matters beyond the 
.,,,,.. jury's knowledge or perception or else those opinions must dispel a common misconception. 
The Court finds that expert opinions as to the question of guilt or innocence will not fit this 
criteria and grants the motion insofar as it relates to expert opinions elicited on direct 
examination. 
As fo cross examination, the issue is slightly different. Here, a witness's opinion may be 
legitimate cross-examination fodder in order to disclose a witness' bias. This probative value 
must be weighed against the danger of unfair prejudice. See generally, Rule 403. Accordingly, if 
either party wants to elicit such an opinion on cross examination, they should approach the bench 
before so doing and the matter will be decided on a witness by witness basis. No mention should 
be made of such an opinion in opening statements. 
-
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- 6. Plaintiff's motion to exclude testimony of Roger Marsters 
-
Plaintiff seeks to exclude the expert testimony of Roger Marsters on the basis of a failure to 
supply an expert report. The State replies that Dr. Marsters' report is his prior testimony at the 
1966 trial. In an abundance of caution, the court will require Dr. Marsters to submit a report 
within eleven calendar days of today; that report may make reference to the 1966 testimony but 
must do so with citations to the specific portions of the transcript which Dr. Marsters is 
incorporating into his report. 
7. Defendant's Oral Motion for an Adverse Inference Instruction on Spoliation 
After Plaintiff had withdrawn its motion for an adverse inference instruction on 
spoliation, Defendant moved for such an inference on the basis that certain evidence had been 
returned to Dr. Sheppard after the 1966 trial and, thus, if subsequently lost or destroyed, should 
be the basis for an adverse spoliation instruction. 
This motion is denied. There is no evidence that, at the time he received materials from 
the State, Dr. Sheppard would have known that, 20 years later, the state Legislature would 
provide for statutory relief for wrongful imprisonment. Accordingly, the loss or destruction of 
evidence would not have been the act of a person attempting to gain an advantage in a lawsuit. 
8. Defendant's motion to exclude Exhibits (old numbers) 3, 4, 8, 9, etc. 
Defendant has moved to exclude these exhibits which they represent all relate to "other 
acts" of Richard Eberling. For the reasons already stated in regard to the Eberling "other acts," 
this motion is granted. The Court will reconsider this motion, and address other relevancy and 
hearsay issues which may be attendant thereto, if and when Plaintiff establishes a basis for 
admissibility of the Eberling "other acts." 
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9. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Exhibits (Old Numbers) 5, 7, and 88 
Defendant seeks to exclude several exhibits regarding George Eberling which, upon 
review, do not appear to relate to any "other acts." Plaintiff has represented that these exhibits 
are relevant. 
The motion in limine is denied. The Court will examine the relevancy of the evidence in 
the context of other evidence presented at trial. In the event, evidence, whether it be these items 
or others, is not admitted and a party's prior reference to that evidence in opening statement or in 
questions to witnesses has created confusion in a juror's mind, the Court canl clarify that 
confusion in its instructions to the jury. 
10. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Exhibits (Old Numbers) 65, 66, 67, Etc. 
Defendant seeks to exclude exhibits relating to the Durken homicide. For the reasons 
already mentioned regarding alleged "other acts" of Eberling, this motion is granted. 
11. Motion to Compel Production of the Fray Homicide File 
The Court will make available for counsel for the Plaintiff those portions of the Fray 
homicide file which the Court, on the basis of its in camera review believes are relevant 
discovery in this case. A copy of those documents furnished to counsel for Plaintiff will also be 
given to counsel for Defendant. These are excerpts from an open homicide file. Accordingly, 
the Court will issue a separate Protective Order on this material which will include the following: 
a. No copies are to be made of the documents 
b. The documents may not leave the custody of an attorney ofrecord. 
c. The documents may not be shown to any person except employees and 
investigators of the firm of Friedman and Gilbert, all of whom shall review the 
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protective order before being allowed to see the documents. Review and other use 
of these documents shall related solely to Plaintiffs preparation of this trial. 
d. If Plaintiff needs relief from this order for the limited purpose of additional 
disclosure, Plaintiff shall contact Defendant and they may informally agree to 
further disclosure. In the absence of such agreement, or in the event that attorney 
work product considerations make consultation with Defendant impracticable, the 
matter should be brought to the court's attention. 
e. These materials shall not be introduced into evidence, included in motions or 
otherwise referred to on the record of this court, without prior disclosure to and 
agreement by Defendant or without prior court approval. 
f. The single copy being furnished to counsel for Plaintiff will be returned to 
- counsel for Defendant following the trial and the exhaustion of all appeals. 
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